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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years the level of international
financial activity has skyrocketed as the world economy has
become increasingly integrated. This increase of international
financial activity is the result of the development of new
communications technologies, the creation of international
financial institutions and transactions aimed at escaping rigid
domestic regulation,' and the adjustment of countries to the
demise of the Bretton Woods system.2 These trends and
changes have required both private entities and national
governments to become active participants in world capital
markets.' Decisions about the country location of investment
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1987, Williams College.
' See David C. Donald, Toward a Single European Capital Market: The
European Economic Community's Directive to Liberalize Capital Flows, 20
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 139, 142-43 (1988).
" See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 619-620 (11th ed. 1980); WALTER
JONES, THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 503-525 (6th ed. 1988). In
1971, the Bretton Woods system of fixed rate currency values, which was
based on the United States' commitment to exchange dollars for gold at a
one-to-one ratio, was abandoned in favor of the Smithsonian Agreement
which created more or less freely floating exchange rates. While the change
freed the United States from an obligation it found increasingly difficult to
meet, the new system created a much higher risk of monetary instability in
the world economy.
' "[T]ransnational corporations move capital around the world creating
simultaneously capital deficits for the home accounts and improved over-
seas assets; governments use their reserves for both anticipating future
(101)
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and borrowing have increasingly become separated from
decisions about the country location of real sector activity.'
As a result, from 1964 to 1985, international banking grew at
a compound rate of some 26% per year.5 World financial flows
are now 50 times larger than goods flows.'
The increased importance of capital manipulation7 has
created a potential competitive advantage for financial services
companies based in countries with largely deregulated capital
markets. One of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the
treaty creating the European Economic Community' is the
free movement of capital While the elimination of barriers
payments needs and purchasing their own currencies from foreign central
banks in order to control their value and may also buy other currencies to
affect their values." JONES, supra note 2, at 512.
4 R.C. BRYANT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 20 (1987)
quoted in Donald, supra note 1, at 143. Cf., Shari Siegel, Slouching Toward
Integration: International Banking Before and After 1992, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 147, 150 n.12 citing R. PECCHIOLI, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
BANKING: THE POLICY ISSUES 16-24 (1983).
' "The comparable growth rates for trade and [real] output were,
respectively, only about 12.5 and 10.5 percent." BRYANT, supra note 4,
quoted in DONALD, supra note 1, at 143-44 n.23.
6 BRYANT, supra note 4, at 150 n.12, citing Spero, Guiding Global
Finance, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 114, 114 (Winter 1988-89).
' As distinguished from capital movements based on real sector
production.
' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 928 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) (original version)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The purpose of the Treaty was to create a
common market for goods, services, persons, and capital. See id. arts. 2, 3.
9 See STANLEY CROSSICK & MARGIE LINDSAY, EUROPEAN BANKING LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY AND MEMBER STATE LEGISLATION 9-10 (1983);
MARC DAsSESSE & STUART ISAACS, EEC BANKING LAW 109-111 (1985).
Article 67(1) of the EEC Treaty provides the fundamental operative rule:
During the transitional period and to the extent necessary to
ensure the proper functioning of the common market, Member
States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restric-
tions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in
Member States and any discrimination based on the nationality or
on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such
capital is invested.
Major provisions of other applicable articles are as follows:
Article 68 constrains Member States from discriminating when applying
domestic rules regulating the capital market to capital movements
liberalized pursuant to the Treaty.
Article 70 forms the legal basis for EEC law regarding coordination of
exchange rate policies toward third countries by the Member States. The
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to the trade of goods has received the bulk of attention
surrounding the creation of a European Common Market,' °
the establishment of the free movement of capital is an equally
pivotal step in the creation of the internal market." As the
European Court of Justice 2 has noted, "[the] freedom to
move certain types of capital is, in practice, a pre-condition for
the effective exercise of other freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty."' 3
The fundamental goal of the free movement of capital is to
provide Community residents and firms with the right "to
invest within or borrow from residents [or institutions] of
another Member State making use of all the techniques
available under that Member State's financial system." 4
Under such a liberalized regime, the competitive structure of
the financial services industry ("FSI") in Europe will be
radically altered. Financial services will be delivered interna-
tionally with greater speed and efficiency, and with lower
costs. 5  The exploitation of the competitive advantages
provision seeks the highest level of liberalization possible.
Article 71 urges against the creation of any new exchange restrictions
or the restrictive modification of any existing rules on capital movement.
Article 73 is an escape clause that allows Member States to take
protective measures in the face of major disturbances in their domestic
economies coming as a result of capital movements.
10 See Peter Oliver & Jean-Pierre Bache, Free Movement of Capital
Between the Member States: Recent Developments, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
61, 61 (1989); J. Kodwo Bentil, Free Movement of Capital in the Common
Market-I, NEW L. J., 963, 963 (Oct. 14, 1982).
" In fact, the liberalization of Europe's financial system has begun to
have a significant catalyzing effect on the development of the internal
market. "Finance is where project 1992 is moving most impressively
forward-the business in which there is real progress towards the one-
market ideal. This movement promises.., to have the most telling impact
on Europe's governments of any that the internal-market campaign will
bring about by the mid-1990s." 1992; The Barriers Within, ECONOMIST, July
9, 1988 (Special Section), at 15, 16.
12 Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 8, empowers the European
Court of Justice to make authoritative rulings on EEC law when an issue
is referred to it by a court or tribunal of a Member State.
13 Case 203/80, Public Prosecutor v. Guerrino; Preliminary ruling of 11
Nov. 1981 [1981] ECR 2595.
14 Oliver & Bache, supra note 10, at 66; see also CROSSICK & LINDSAY,
supra note 9, at 10.
" Siegel, supra note 4, at 152; See also Stanley Hoffman, The European
Community and 1992, 68 FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1989, at 27, 28. ("European
industrialists will achieve economies of scale that will allow them to operate
1992]
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produced by the free movement of capital will, in turn, further
spur regional integration in Europe, a prerequisite to contin-
ued European competitiveness in the global market. 6
The implementation of free capital movement in the EEC
provides competitive advantages and opportunities for the FSI.
The rise of illegal narcotics sales within the Member States
and the attendant laundering 7 of large sums of money"
are, however, threatening to restrict the ability of the Europe-
an financial community to exploit the liberalized capital flows.
Saturation of the American market has spurred drug
traffickers to attempt to expand the European market.
Initially, Spain proved an efficient point of entry for the Latin
American drug cartels because of its common language and
culture.2" Following a crackdown by Spanish authorities in
1989, drug traffickers have now begun to adjust their routes
more efficiently than if they were confined to their domestic markets..
EEC: Agreement on Free Circulation of Capital Goes Into Effect, Inter Press
Service, July 2, 1990 (Free movement of capital will reduce financial costs
throughout the EEC as "a result of a greater competition on the part of
banks in attracting new clients, as well as a reduction in the cost of
money.").
1 Hoffman, supra note 15, at 28, 29.
The United Nations Draft Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, article 1, section G) defines money
laundering as "the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
disposition, movement or ownership of proceeds and includes the movement
or conversion of proceeds by electronic transmission." See infra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
"' A task force created by the Group of Seven (Canada, France, West
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
"estimates that profits from drugs and other criminal activities worth
Dollars 80 bn are being laundered annually in the US and Europe." Robert
Graham, Limits on Bank Secrecy Proposed to Curb Laundering, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1990, at 1, 1.
' Stewart Tendler, Plea for United Front to Stem Cocaine Imports, THE
TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 1990 (Home News section) at 3. See also Elizabeth
Neuffer, A Borderless Europe Beckons to Drug Traffickers, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 15, 1990, at 16, 16. The growth of the European drug market is
reflected in the increase in cocaine seizures in Europe from 155 kilos in 1978
to nearly 5.5 tons in 1988. Richard Donkin, Hurd Urges European Link-up
To Confiscate Cocaine Profits, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 19, 1989, at 6, 6.
20 Elizabeth Neuffer, Spain's Smugglers Turn to Cocaine, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 15, 1990, at 16, 16. (In 1988, 62% of all cocaine seized in Europe was
found in Spain.).
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to make greater use of West Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom.2 '
The rapid growth of the illegal drug trade in Europe has
raised the fear that "the conjunction of 1992s single market,
drug trafficking, and money laundering could undermine the
integrity of the financial system and disrupt financial mar-
kets." In response to this specter, the European Council
approved in June 1991 a "Council Directive on prevention of
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering."' The directive seeks to regulate the FSI with
regard to financial transactions that are commonly or poten-
tially part of money laundering schemes. The Money Launder-
ing Directive is based in part on the belief that "the fight
against drug money cannot be won without the help of
banks."2' However, in enlisting banks as the "first line of
defense in the fight against drug[s],"25 new duties have been
placed on the financial community that may serve to dampen
the competitive advantages produced by the liberalization of
the movement of capital within the EEC.
The Member States are thus faced with a perplexing
question: how can the EEC combat drug money laundering
without unduly restricting the competitive advantages created
for the European financial services industry by the free
movement of capital within the Community?
This Comment begins by briefly setting out the present
state of free capital movement in the EEC. Section II will
define the EEC FSI and analyze the effect of the free move-
ment of capital on the competitive structure of the industry.
Section III will provide an overview of common money
laundering techniques and will examine how the Money
" Tendler, supra note 19. (The Spanish law enforcement efforts netted
the arrest on cocaine smuggling charges of 2,000 people from 70 countries
during 1989.).
2 Bruce Zagaris & Markus Bornheim, Cooperation and Fight Against
Money Laundering in Context of European Community Integration, 54
BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 3 at 119 (Jan. 22, 1990).
"" Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 [hereinafter Money
Laundering Directive].
4 Interpol Secretary General Raymond Kendall speaking before the
French Banking Association on April 18, 1990, quoted in BNA DAILY REPORT
FOR EXECUTIVEs, Apr. 19, 1990, der no. 76, at A7.
25 Id.
19921
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Laundering Directive will serve to defeat many of the competi-
tive advantages produced by the free movement of capital
between the Member States. A brief conclusion will close the
Comment.
2. FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
During the early 1980s a series of Council Directives were
passed that focused on capital qua capital,"6 rather than on
capital movements as by-products of trade in goods.2 Out of
"6 In traditional financial theory, capital represents debt or equity
available for investment.
Donald, supra note 1, at 140 (citations omitted), provides the following
representative list of transaction types commonly encompassed within the
scope of capital movements:
(1) changes in bank claims vis-a-vis foreigners; (2) money market
transactions of non-residents; (3) new bond issues by nonresidents;
(4) transactions in existing securities (trading in company securities
and government issues); and (5) direct investment flows ... The
movements are both long and short term, and, except for bank
claims which are often associated with the international sale of
goods, they are independent of real sector trade.
Despite its recognition of the free movement of capital as a fundamental
freedom, the EEC Treaty fails to define either "capital" or "movement of
capital." Major European Court of Justice cases involving the definition of
these terms include Casati, supra note 13; Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83
Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Preliminary Ruling of 31
January 1984, 1984 ECR 377; Case 7/78 Regina v. Thompson, Johnson, and
Woodiwiss, Judgment of 23 Nov. 1978, 1978 ECR 2247. See also Oliver &
Bache, supra note 10; Donald, supra note 1; DASSESSE & ISAACS, supra note
9; J. Kodwo Bentil, Free Movement of Capital in the Common Market-iI,
NEW L. J. 1049, 1049 (Nov. 11, 1982); Jean-Victor Louis, Free Movement of
Capital in the Community: The Casati Judgement, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
443 (1982). The court came closest to providing a straightforward definition
of capital movements in Luisi when it wrote, "movements of capital are
financial operations essentially concerned with the investment of the sum
in question and rather than remuneration or a service."
For further discussion of what constitutes capital and capital movement
see the discussion of the Nomenclature of the Capital Movements Directive
and the section on the definition of the FSI infra section 3.1.
2 The first progress toward free capital movement was seen in Directive
85/583/EEC, promulgated in December 1985, which liberalized a single
category of transactions (operations involving certain types of unit trusts).
In November 1986, Council Directive 86/566, 1986 O.J. (L 332) 22
amended the First Directive for the implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty of 11 May 1960 (Council Directive 43/921, 1960 O.J. (Spec. Ed.) as
amended) (for a description of the First Directive and its original amend-
ment, see DASSESSE & ISAACS, supra note 9, at 111-112; Oliver & Bache,
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the debate surrounding these Directives three principles
emerged that became the basis for the ultimate liberalization
of capital movements:
First, the creation of a single financial market requires
... free movement of capital. 2s.. . Second, the free-
dom to provide financial services should not be based
upon standardisation of products offered but rather on
harmonisation of the main prudential rules applying to
those supplying services so as to permit mutual recogni-
tion of national provisions and home country control.
Third, any attempt to subject all progress towards
liberalisation of capital movements to the prior harmon-
isation of national financial systems would have the
effect of arresting the process of financial integra-
tion.29
The Council of the European Communities 0 took the final
supra note 10, at 63-65; F. BuRR6ws, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 274-279 (1987)). Directive 86/566 implemented the first
phase of a two-stage liberalization program by transferring from a
conditionally liberalized status to an unconditionally liberalized status a
number of basic transactions, including liberating long-term commercial
credits, transactions in over-the-counter securities, and guaranteeing that
any shares presently traded or being introduced on the securities exchange
of a Member State would be admitted for trade to the exchange of another
Member State. The new Directive also created uniform rules for two sets
of transactions that had previously been treated separately: (1) direct
investments and investments in real estate, personal capital movements,
short- and medium-term credits in respect to commercial transactions or the
provision of services; and (2) acquisition by residents of foreign securities
dealt in on a stock exchange or the converse (i.e., acquisition by non-
residents of domestic securities dealt in on a stock exchange).
With the adoption of Directive 86/566, the "second phase" of liberaliza-
tion aimed at the unconditional liberation of all international capital
transactions was begun. See Oliver & Bache, supra note 10, at 65-67;
Donald, supra note 1, at 141, 147. This second phase was to be completed
with the full implementation of Directive 88/361, see text and notes infra at
p. 10.
" Oliver & Bache, supra note 10, at 66, have defined "free movement of
capital" as "the right of a resident of a Member State to invest within or
borrow from residents of another Member State making use of all the
techniques available under that Member State's financial system."
2 1 Id.
" In order to achieve the creation of a common market in Europe,
the Treaty of Rome, buttressed by national legislation in each of the
Member States, established a legal order vesting legislative
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
step on this path when it adopted the "Directive of 24 June
1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty."31
The Capital Movements Directive repealed the existing rules
on capital movements 2 and decreed that its terms, which
fully liberalized capital movements among Member States,
were to be implemented by July 1, 1990."s The directive is
"the basis of the entire financial services liberalization
process." 4 To this end, article 1 of the Capital Movements
Directive declares that "Member States shall abolish restric-
tions on movements of capital taking place between persons
resident in Member States." As an aid in this process, Annex
I of the Directive provides a Nomenclature of the capital
competence in Community institutions [e.g., the Council of the
European Communities]. These institutions would enact supra-
national law to 'harmonise' regulation in Member States thereby
removing impediments to a single market. The form of legislation
most commonly used to achieve this end is the Directive [EEC
Treaty art. 100, see also arts. 189-192]. A Directive requires the
Member States to adopt legislation intended to achieve specified
objectives within a set period of time, usually two years from the
date of the Directive. Although Directives require implementing
legislation in the Member State, the form and method of implemen-
tation is left to the discretion of the government of
each Member State. [EEC Treaty art. 189].
DAVID BARNARD, THE EFFECT OF 1992 ON THE EUROMARKETS, CORPORATE
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: NEW FINANCIAL INSTRU-
MENTS AND TEcHNIQUES 1989, point 2 (1989).
Even if a directive is not implemented by a Member State by the
appointed date, it may provide rights to individuals that are enforceable by
the national courts. See CROSSICK & LINDSAY, supra note 9, at 6.
3' Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5 [hereinafter Capital
Movements Directive].
" Specifically, Council Directive 88/361 repealed as of July 1, 1990 the
First Council Directive on Capital Movements of 11 May 1960 (Council
Directive 43/921, 1960 O.J. (Spec. Ed.)) as amended and Council Directive
72/156, 1972 O.J. (Spec. Ed.) (L 91) 13.
33 See article 6(1). Article 6(2) authorizes Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
Ireland to maintain certain restrictions until the end of 1992 to ease the
transition to a fully liberalized system. Article 6(3) and Annex V allow
Belgium and Luxembourg to continue to operate dual exchange markets
until December 31, 1992, with the caveat that the exchange rate rulings on
the two markets exhibit no great or lasting differences.
34 Annabelle Ewing, The Single Market of 1992: Implications for Banking
and Investment Services in the EC, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453,
454 (1990).
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movements referred to in article 1 of the Directive. 5 Trans-
actions that had formerly been restricted and are now liberal-
ized include financial loans and credits, current and deposit
account operations, and transactions in money market
securities.3" Moreover, the Directive makes it clear that "this
[liberalization] requirement entails not only the abolition of
foreign exchange restrictions as such (i.e., measures prohibit-
ing or restricting transfers relating to capital movements) but
also the removal of all obstacles to the execution of the capital
transactions themselves."" In short, the Directive gives
financial service firms free access to the financial system of
any Member State "whether this access be in the form of a
multi-billion [European Currency Unit] bond issue or a simple
checking account." s
" While the Annex explicitly states that the Nomenclature is "not an
exhaustive list for the notion of capital movements," and thus should not be
read to restrict the "scope of the principle of full liberalization of capital
movements," the Nomenclature and the explanatory notes that accompany
it largely clear up lingering questions as to the definition of "capital
movements."
The Nomenclature breaks capital movements into thirteen broad
categories which are individually defined: I. Direct Investments; II.
Investments in Real Estate; III. Operations in Securities Normally Dealt in
on the Capital Market; IV. Operations in Units of Collective Investment
Undertakings; V. Operations in Securities and Other Instruments Normally
Dealt in on the Money Market; VI. Operations in Current and Deposit
Accounts with Financial Institutions; VII. Credits Related to Commercial
Transactions or to the Provision of Services in which a Resident is
Participating; VIII. Financial Loans and Credits; IX. Sureties, Other
Guarantees and Rights of Pledge; X. Transfers in Performance of Insurance
Contracts; XI. Personal Capital Movements; XII. Physical Import and Export
of Financial Assets; XIII. Other Capital Movements.
36 The complete move away from viewing capital movements as mere
adjuncts to the trade in goods is exhibited by the fact that the Directive
fully liberalizes long-term bond issues and bank financing, as well as trade
in instruments normally exchanged on the money market, including short-
term securities, treasury bills and other negotiable bills, certificates of
deposit, bankers' acceptances, commercial paper, and other like instruments.
Capital Movements Directive, supra note 31, at 12.
s Oliver & Bache, supra note 10, at 68.
s Donald, supra note 1, at 148. The Capital Movements Directive is also
"supplemented by a regulation establishing a single facility providing
medium-term financial support for Member States' balances of payments."
EEC Council Regulation No. 1969/88 of 24 June 1988 establishing a single
facility providing medium-term assistance for Member States' balance of
payments. 1988 O.J. (L 178) 1. This regulation "enables the Council to
grant loans to Member States which face difficulties in their balance of
1992]
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The sweeping liberalization instituted by the Capital
Movements Directive leaves open questions concerning the
extent to which Member States retain power in the regulation
of capital flows. Generally, "Member States retain responsibil-
ity for the actions of monetary policies and... for the internal
organisation of their capital and credit markets, unless
provisions adopted at Community level regarding monetary
cooperation or harmonisation of national rules dictate other-
wise.""9 Article 3 also contains a safeguard clause that
allows Member States, after consultation with the Commission
in most cases, but unilaterally in the case of a crisis, to restrict
short-term capital movements for up to six months if monetary
or exchange-rate policies are disrupted.4
While the two provisions noted above are fairly straight
forward, Article 4 leaves unresolved the exact amount of power
the EEC has to act within individual Member States to protect
the free movement of capital. Under Article 4, Member States
retain the power to "take all requisite measures to prevent
infringements of their laws and regulations ... or to lay down
procedures for the declaration of capital movements for
purposes of administrative or statistical information."" Such
provisions are not, however, to impede capital movements that
occur in keeping with Community law. As the new Directive
has so recently gone into effect, there is no case law to offer
any guidance as to how the EEC will mediate disputes over
individual an Member State's use or abuse of power over
capital movements.
The original proposal introducing the Capital Movements
Directive42 does, however, offer an indication of the parame-
current payments or capital movements." Panagiotis Tridimas, Movement
of Capital and the Law Relating to Companies and Trade in Securities, 38
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 214, 215 (Jan. 1988).
s' Oliver & Bache, supra note 10, at 69.
40 Annex II to the Capital Movements Directive, supra note 31, at 12,
provides a "list of operations referred to in Article 3 of the Directive."
Annex II notes that "[t]he restrictions which Member States may apply to
the capital movements listed above must be defined and applied in such a
way as to cause the least possible hindrance to the free movement of
persons, goods and services."
41 1& at 6.
42 Creation of an European Financial Area, COM(87) 550 final [hereinaf-
ter Commission Dec.].
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ters within which Member States exercise such authority.
According to the introductory document, Member States will
be required to enforce their regulatory schemes against
domestic and other Member States' individuals, firms, and
transactions without discriminating." A Community resi-
dent using the financial services of a Member State not his or
her residence will, in turn, be blocked from invoking the rules
of his or her home country as protection against the regula-
tions of the State in which he or she is conducting business.
Finally, de facto discrimination arising from domestic regula-
tions will be allowed toward foreign financial institutions,
provided that the regulations do not inhibit the institutions'
ability to provide financial services, but rather only affect such
areas as exchange rates. The purpose of this exception is to
protect against a foreign branch institution causing currency
fluctuations within a Member State as a result of the
institution's manipulation of large volumes of foreign ex-
change."
3. THE EEC FSI AND THE COMPETITIVE
EFFECT OF FREE CAPITAL MOVEMENT
The financial services area has not been traditionally
thought of as an industry, nor as an international entity, nor
has it been believed to be particularly competitive on a global
scale. The liberalization of capital movement in the EEC,
combined with broader changes in the world economy, howev-
er, has changed the traditional structure and function of
financial services. Today, financial services in Europe and
elsewhere are delivered by a highly competitive global
industry. The introduction of free capital movement will
continue to significantly affect the competitive structure of the
industry.
45
4Id. at 15.
44 See Donald, supra note 1, at 149.
4" The theoretical basis for this section of the Comment is Harvard
Business School Professor Michael E. Porter's 1980 study COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS.
1992]
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3.1. Definition and Structure of FSI in the EEC
In its directives the European Council has legally defined
the FSI as consisting of two components: (1) credit institutions
which are defined as "undertaking[s] whose business is to
receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and
to grant credits for [their] own account[s];"" and (2) financial
institutions which are defined as undertakings other than
credit institutions whose principal activity is to carry out one
or more of the following operations:
1. lending (including inter alia consumer credit, mort-
gage credit, factoring, with or without recourse, and
financing of commercial transactions)
2. financial leasing
3. money transmission services
4. issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit
cards, travellers' checks, and bankers' drafts)
5. guarantees and commitments
6. trading for own account or for account of customers in:
a. money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs,
etc.)
b. foreign exchange
c. financial futures and options
d. exchange and interest rate instruments
e. transferable securities
7. participating in share issues and the provision of
services related to such issues
8. advising undertakings on capital structure, industrial
strategy and related questions and advice and services
relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings
9. money broking
10. portfolio managing and advising
11. safekeeping and administrating securities
12. safe custody services.4
48 First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, Council Directive 77/780,
art. 1, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30.
'" This list of operations derives from the list annexed to Council
Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1.
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As a legal construct, therefore, the FSI covers a wide array
of specifically defined activities.
As a practical business construct, companies providing
financial services function as a single industry4 8 that encom-
passes all the activities of both credit institutions and financial
institutions, as well as the activities of insurance companies.
The FSI employs three percent of the EEC's workers and
accounts for six percent of its pay.4 The raw material of the
industry is capital. Capital is packaged for "sale" in myriad
products, including initial public offerings, savings accounts,
life insurance policies, letters of credit, and many forms of
loans (e.g., consumer loans, mortgage loans, commercial loans).
Financial services firms traditionally filled these needs,
and thus competed, almost solely within domestic markets. As
capital movements rather than trade have increasingly become
the driving force behind the world economy, however, a shift
in the focus and delivery of financial services has begun to
take place.50  The growth of truly global industries5" has
4An industry can be generically defined as a group of companies
creating products that are close substitutes for each other.
4 1992; The Barriers Within, supra note 11, at 16.
Peter F. Drucker, The Changed World Economy, 64 FOREIGN AFF.,
768, 782 (Summer 1986):
World trade in goods is larger, much larger, than it has ever been
before. And so is the 'invisible trade,' the trade in services.
Together, the two amount to around $2.5 trillion to 3 trillion a year.
But the London Eurodollar market, in which the world's financial
institutions borrow from and lend to each other, turns over $300
billion each working day, or $75 trillion a year, a volume at least 25
times that of world trade.
In addition, there are the foreign exchange transactions in the
world's main money centers in which one currency is traded against
another. These run around $150 billion a day, or about $35 trillion
a year-12 times the worldwide trade in goods and services.
Of course, many of these Eurodollars, yen and Swiss francs are
just being moved from one pocket to another and may be counted
more than once. A massive discrepancy still exists, and there is
only one conclusion: capital movements unconnected to trade-and
indeed largely independent of it-greatly exceed trade finance.
sl PORTER, supra note 45, at 275, defines a global industry as "[an
industry] in which the strategic positions of competitors in major geographic
or national markets are fundamentally affected by their overall global
positions... [these firms must] compete on a worldwide, co-ordinated basis
or face strategic disadvantages." A global industry can, thus, be distin-
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
forced goods and services producers to take into account
factors that do not affect domestic entities: factor cost differ-
ences among countries (e.g., comparative labor costs and labor
productivity, raw material costs, energy costs, transportation
costs); differing circumstances in foreign markets; different
roles of foreign governments; and differences in goals, resourc-
es, and ability to monitor foreign competitors.
Traditional economic theory would hold that these "real"
economic factors would combine to determine exchange rates.
In reality, however, the decoupling of the "real" economy from
the "symbol" economy52 has increasingly caused financial
factors to determine how production costs in country A
compare to production costs in country B.
As purely financial concerns have become more important
and more manipulable, "[a]ny firm exposed to the international
economy has to realize that it is in two businesses at the same
time. It is both a maker of goods (or a supplier of services)
and a 'financial' business.""3 A business can no longer simply
decide whether or not to borrow or to raise equity capital; the
business must now ask,
[s]hould the debt be at a fixed or a floating rate? In
which currency? When should these decisions be
changed? Should an instrument come with an option
attached allowing investors to buy or sell at particular
prices? Is it worth paying a fee to have a cap or floor
put on the interest rate?5
4
In order to exploit the need of companies to manage global
financial concerns, FSI firms have had to shift their focus from
trade-bound domestic financial transactions to world capital
markets per se.55 In doing so, it has become a strategic
guished from an international industry, which contains companies that
function in many different countries, but which do so through basically
autonomous subsidiaries that compete independently in each domestic
market.
52 Drucker, supra note 50, at 781, defines the symbol economy as "capital
movements, exchange rates and credit flows." See also text supra at note 4.
"Drucker, supra note 50, at 787.
4Backward, and Yet Forward, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 27, 1991 (Survey:
International Finance), at 7.
" A similar conclusion can be applied to the EEC itself. See Donald,
supra note 1, at 141.
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imperative that the various sub-entities of an FSI organization
function seamlessly, and not as independent fiefdoms con-
cerned with only one domestic reality. However, "providing
cross-border services is virtually impossible [if an organization
is faced with] the existence of exchange control restrictions
and discriminatory national fiscal provisions."
3.2. Free Capital Movement as Global Competitive Advantage
for the FSI
As an integrated world economy continues to evolve, the
number and variety of truly global industries will rise. In
order to provide adequate financial services to these indus-
tries, the FSI itself will be forced to become global. Both FSI
firms and their global clients have to be particularly aware of
a number of strategic factors, including foreign competitors, a
broader pool of potential entrants, a wider range of possible
substitutes, and the continued likelihood that cultural
differences will produce dissimilar goals and competitive
strategies for individual firms within the same industry.
While the FSI exhibits a high degree of innovation, over
time financial products become largely fungible from firm to
firm. Thus, competition within the FSI, while influenced in
A concrete example of the EEC's new focus on the importance of capital
was the creation of the European Monetary System ("EMS"). Fearing the
effects capital market fluctuations would have on their trade and balance
of payments, the EC established in 1979 the EMS through which member
states pool part of their gold and foreign currency reserves. While all twelve
EC members (Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Britain, Portugal, and Greece) belong to the
EMS, the exchange rate mechanism ("ERM") of the EMS did not originally
include Britain, Portugal, or Greece. Britain joined the ERM in October
1990. The ERM acts as a managed float system; fluctuations of exchange
rates are contained within a narrow, pre-determined band by members
valuing their currencies using a combination of raising or lowering their
respective interest rates, by buying and selling each others' currencies or by
adjusting their fiscal policies (e.g., changing tax rates). The EMS has
functioned to reduce inflation in Europe and to influence member govern-
ments to follow similar (if not yet truly coordinated) fiscal and economic
policies. Because Britain declined to join the exchange rate mechanism of
the EMS at its inception, the system has been largely tied to the value of
the Deutsche mark and West Germany's policy of monetary stability has
become the European norm. See JONES, supra note 2, at 511; Hoffman,
supra note 15; What the ERM Really Means, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Oct. 7, 1990.
56 Ewing, supra note 34, at 453.
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the short-term by innovation, is driven in the long-term by the
efficiencies firms develop in delivering and servicing their
products. The free movement of capital does away with many
transactional costs and barriers, allowing more efficient
delivery of financial services. The FSI in Europe is conse-
quently faced with a significant competitive opportunity
following the implementation of free capital movement.
3.2.1. Comparative Advantage
A comparative advantage exists when a country or coun-
tries provide substantial advantages in factor cost, government
regulation, location, and the like.5" The competitive posture
of the global firm in countries possessing a comparative advan-
tage is crucial to its overall competitive position.
The comparative advantage of free capital movement can
be illustrated in reverse by the experience of the United States
in the early 1960's. At that time, the United States dominated
the international financial markets. However, the imposition
of "the Interest Equalization Tax ("IET") and the Foreign
Credit Restraint Program ("FCRP") drove many international
financial transactions out of the United States and gave birth
to the eurodollar5" markets." 9 While to conclude that the
United States catalyzed the growth of the European financial
markets solely as a result of its regulatory activity is too facile,
the exodus of capital from the United States to Europe demon-
strates that a lack of capital regulation can act as a strong
comparative advantage.
A second illustration of the comparative advantage that the
free movement of capital provides the EEC FSI is the increas-
ing securitization of international capital flows."0 While, in
the past, a capital consumer's only recourse for raising funds
was a commercial bank, external financing now often occurs
through the issuing of marketable securities. The linkage of
the various European securities markets through the free
movement of capital creates a viable competitive alternative to
"' Two of the most easily recognized comparative advantages in the FSI
are banking secrecy and lenient tax laws.
58 A eurodollar is a United States dollar held outside the United States.
5' Donald, supra note 1, at 139.
60 See id., at 144.
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United States and Japanese markets, and "[i]n the financial
sphere, the attractiveness of an integrated whole is much
greater than the sum of its component parts."61
The comparative advantage of free capital movement is
particularly clear in relation to exchange rates. "[T]he
abolition of exchange control restrictions in the Member States
is the first step toward... mak[ing] the integration of banking
and investment services a reality in the EC. The existence of
such restrictions effectively prevents ... companies from freely
transferring or holding financial assets." 2 The elimination
of exchange control restrictions frees the FSI from domestic
political concerns and their effect on the regulation of ex-
change rates. Moreover, the industry may more accurately
" EEC Press Release IP(86) 556, Nov. 17, 1986, at 2 quoted in Donald,
supra note 1, at 144. This point is particularly borne out by the United
States, which possesses the largest unified economy in the world, but is
hampered by the split in the FSI engendered by the Glass-Steagall Act
which decrees that investment banking functions and commercial banking
functions cannot be undertaken by the same firm. "The U.S. must take
active steps to eliminate the current balkanization of American banking if
it is to meet the new European challenge in the financial services market."
Siegel, supra note 4, at 152.
6" Ewing, supra note 34, at 454. It is not surprising that nations are
reluctant to give up control of exchange rates. The value of a country's
currency will determine the price of imports to and exports from that
country. The implications of this simple concept are profound:
If, for example, the rise of the dollar's value makes American-
built machinery so expensive internationally that consumers turn
to German or French imports... then the machine tool industry in
the United States will be adversely affected. Fewer units will be
exported, and because the overall production level was set with the
assumption that exports represented productivity in excess of
domestic demand, buyers at home will not be able to consume those
units that are no longer exported. Results: Production goes down;
investment is curtailed; income is reduced; employees are released;
and plants may be closed. But the ramifications run still deeper:
The loss of income results in reduced bank deposits, a decline in
capital accumulation, and a reduction of investment in other
industries. Meanwhile, both the industry and the unemployed
workers pay less to tax revenues-the source of public investment-
commensurate with their lost income. In fact, the workers may now
draw subsistence from public welfare ... transforming them into
financial liabilities for public revenue. Hence as public revenue
declines, public expense rises, and changes are forced upon the
distribution of the public treasury. The variation in currency value
has now resulted in social and economic changes at home.
JONES, supra note 2, at 505.
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control its currency positions for the purposes of risk manage-
ment and investment.
3.2.2. Economies of Scale
The EEC FSI will gain production economies of scale"3
from the free movement of capital; once a firm from one
Member State develops a particular financial product or
service, the common regulatory environment produced by the
free capital movement system will make its application in the
other Member States far less difficult and less expensive than
in the past. Today, this advantage holds particularly true for
currencies, commodities, and government and corporate
bonds." Economies of marketing and research and develop-
ment will be achieved through free capital movement because
the larger EEC market will allow a financial services firm to
sell a higher volume of each product developed and thereby
more easily recoup its development and marketing costs.
Moreover, a larger market allows the fixed costs of creating
and maintaining an organization to be spread across a larger
customer base.
3.3. Impediments to Achieving Competitive Advantages from
the Free Movement of Capital
Despite the benefits described above, there are a number
of impediments which may offset the advantages of competing
on the global level.6 5
One significant hindrance confronting the FSI is the need
to gain access to distribution channels in each domestic
6" "Economies of scale are enjoyed when the average unit cost of
production goes down as production increases. One way to achieve
economies of scale is to spread fixed costs over a larger volume of produc-
tion." BREALEY AND MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 796, n.5
(3rd ed., 1988). In addition to production, common areas in which economies
of scale can be derived include marketing, research and development, and
purchasing.
64 Note, however, that diverse domestic legal systems, tax systems, and
accounting practices create more impediments for cross-border flows of
equities. See Backward, and Yet Forward, supra note 54, at 7.
65 Obstacles commonly cited for many global industries include high
transportation and storage costs, the need for local repair services, and a
lack of global demand. None of these factors apply, however, directly to the
FSI.
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market. In reality, this obstructs only some parts of the FSI.
For example, a bank that wishes to compete for retail business
throughout Europe will be forced either to acquire existing
retail outlets or create new outlets as a way of distributing its
products. Financial services firms that deal in the institution-
al or commercial market, however, have less need to maintain
large physical presences in each national market. Modern
communications technology and the market savvy of capital
consumers will combine to bring customers to the firms
maintaining the best competitive posture, regardless of
whether they maintain a significant physical presence in the
customer's home market.6 6 Free movement of capital, there-
fore, is a key component in overcoming distribution needs as
an impediment, as it reduces, for at least some segments of the
FSI, the need for "local" distribution."'
The domestic structural restraints imposed on the industry,
however, are broader and more fundamental deterrents to the
true globalization of the FSI. Almost every national market is
riddled with governmental impediments to global competition.
These institutional barriers include differing tax laws,
accounting practices, fiduciary rules, insider trading stan-
dards, and tariff barriers. Such institutional restraints reduce
the advantage produced by global economies of scale by forcing
firms to retool their products to fit each national market. As
noted above, these impediments are more problematic for the
cross-border flow of equities than for the trading of currencies,
commodities, and bonds.
In a sense, this issue of governmental impediments to
competition is the essence of why the EEC was created, that
is, to form a single European standard that would foster free
competition, rather than 12 separate and often conflicting
domestic standards. The EEC FSI will only continue to gain
" Recall the contention that investing/financing and real production
have become increasingly decoupled as international capital markets have
matured. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
"' The same analysis applied here to local distribution channels can be
applied to the need for a local sales force. In most cases, a salesperson on
the phone in London selling bonds to an investor in France is as effective as
a local French salesperson pushing the same sale. Again, the more
sophisticated the capital consumer, the more important the quality of the
financial product and the less vital the physical location or national identity
of the financial services firm.
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competitive advantages as tax laws, accounting standards, and
reporting requirements become increasingly uniform. The
removal of governmental impediments to capital movements
permits the EEC FSI to function on a scale and with a
flexibility heretofore unknown in the world. This systemic
change will create demand among capital consumers for an
increasingly deregulated, or at least increasingly uniform,
financial system that will hasten the completion of the
European internal market. The more similar national markets
become in their economic and cultural circumstances vis-a-vis
the FSI, the greater the potential for free competition world-
wide as other markets are forced to deregulate their financial
systems in response to the comparative advantages found in
the EEC market.
3.4. Competitive Concerns and Trends in the FSI
3.4.1. Competitive Concerns
A constant concern of the FSI is the relationship between
the industry and the governments of the countries in which
the industry functions. "The two have complex relationships
which can involve many forms of regulation... Home govern-
ments [also] often have objectives, such as .. . balance of
payments, that are not strictly economic, certainly from the
point of view of the firm." Governmental policies directly
influence the FSI. Changes in tax law, shifts in monetary
policy, or alterations in reporting requirements will all
drastically affect the FSI's competitive structure in a given
country. Most often the FSI has little control over the
plethora of domestic political and economic factors, as well as
international concerns, that produce government policies."9
The creation of free capital movement insulates to some extent
the FSI from the vagaries of home government politics; the
regulation of capital can no longer act as a domestic bargain-
ing chip in determining the policies of a Member State. This
affords the FSI the ability to make long-term commitments
68 PORTER, supra note 45, at 291.
68 The FSI is able to exert some influence on government policies through
lobbying, campaign contributions, and the flow of industry executives into
and out of government service. The effect of these influences is relatively
small, however, when a firm is operating in a foreign country.
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and conduct strategic planning in a regulatory environment
that offers some level of stability.
The free movement of capital both exacerbates and
mitigates the FSI's concern regarding the coordination of
global patterns of investments, market positions, and facilities.
The ability to move capital without restraint gives the FSI
unparalleled flexibility in reacting to and taking advantage of
shifts in European capital markets. At the same time, the lack
of regulation may serve to transmit shocks through the
European financial system at much greater speeds and without
any dampening effects."' Consequently, "in maintaining a
competitive balance from a systemic viewpoint, it may be
necessary for firms to make defensive investments in particu-
lar markets and locations." The free movement of capital
will coincidentally enhance the speed and precision at which
the management of such defensive posturing can occur. In
addition, the defensive investments will help further integrate
Europe as a true common market, thereby furthering the EEC
Treaty's goals.
3.4.2. Competitive Trends
Two emerging trends are of great importance for competi-
tion within the FSI. First, "[t]he economic differences among
developed and newly developed countries may be narrowing in
areas like income, factor costs, energy costs, marketing
practices, and distribution channels."12 If this trend contin-
ues, the FSI will have enormous opportunities to develop new
markets and exploit previously underdeveloped economic
systems. Within the EEC itself, the free movement of capital
will provide the FSI with a great deal of room to expand into
and help develop the economies of Greece, Portugal, and
southern Italy, economies that traditionally have lagged
behind their more developed EEC counterparts.
The minimization of the differences among the financial
systems of the various Member States is a prerequisite to fully
" For example, a sudden stock market collapse in a single Member State
could precipitate a wide-spread failure of stock markets within the Common
Market.
71 PORTER, supra note 45, at 293.
721 d. at 295.
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realizing the advantages of the free movement of capital.
Unfortunately, as the EEC continues to evolve toward a truly
unified internal market, some commentators "anticipate[] that
pressure from Member States with highly regulated markets
will eventually restrict deregulation to ... minimum levels
... .,)7 The success of the free capital movement system,
therefore, may depend on another Council Directive proposed
in 1988.' Under article 5 of the proposed directive, banks
would be able to obtain from their home country authorities a
single license valid throughout the EEC. Thus, "a bank
established in any member state will be able to branch
throughout the EC without further authorization from the host
states." 5 The single license would free individual institu-
tions from the highly influential special interest groups within
each individual Member State, and would allow the free
movement of capital to be used as a true competitive advan-
tage.
The second emerging trend confronting the FSI is the
gradual emergence of new large-scale markets. China, India,
and Eastern Europe are all vast markets that have heretofore
been largely untouched by the development of the Western
industrialized economy. The growth of these markets will
depend to a large degree on the effective marshalling of
Western capital markets. The massive pool of capital created
by the realization of the Common Market offers the EEC FSI
significant competitive opportunities to exploit these emerging
mega-markets.7 6 The free movement of capital will enable
goods and services producers to employ financing in the most
efficient manner to capitalize on the new large scale markets.
' 73 Ewing, supra note 34, at 460. Contrary opinion would hold that in fact
the advantages of deregulation in some countries will force the more
regulated countries to relax their restrictions, a kind of "lowest common
denominator" of regulation concept.
71 Commission Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the Coordi-
nation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the
Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending
Directive 771780/EEC, 1988 O.J. (C 84) 1 [hereinafter Second Directive]. See
Siegel, supra note 4, at 161.
71 Siegel, supra note 4, at 161.
7'6 The EEC is itself an emerging large-scale market which, as noted
above, provides the FSI with many competitive opportunities close to home.
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4. MONEY LAUNDERING AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF FREE CAPITAL MOVEMENT
4.1. Common Money Laundering Practices
The United Nations recently released a report which
calculated that the world trade in illicit drugs has grown to
$500 billion per year. According to the report, drugs may have
surpassed oil as the second largest commodity in world trade;
only the arms trade now has a higher turnover rate than the
trade in drugs." Moreover, "cocaine is ... clearly the most
profitable article of trade in the world."78 In order to take
advantage of the drug trade's enormous profits, however,
traffickers must transform large amounts of illegally obtained
currency into readily available and untraceable "clean" assets.
In particular,
[t]he world's biggest consumers of money-laundering
services are Latin American drug smugglers. Their
domestic economies cannot absorb the cash their
international trade generates; like multinational
companies, a big part of their earnings accrue overseas
and, like good businessmen, they want to diversify and
invest abroad in legitimate businesses .... For that,
they need to blot out the connection between that
globetrotting money and the crime that made it.7"
Money laundering techniques have traditionally involved
passing illegal currency through a domestic cash business (e.g.,
a restaurant or casino) and reporting the profits as legal
income from that legitimate activity. Disguising the connec-
tion between money and crime has become increasingly
difficult, however, as the sheer amount of money that drug
traffickers handle has outstripped their ability to use domestic
laundering outlets without drawing the attention of domestic
revenue authorities. "Consequently, most large traffickers now
utilize offshore bank secrecy havens as part of a more sophisti-
"' See George Penintaex, Drugs: A $500 Billion Affair, Inter Press
Service, Apr. 4, 1990.
78 World Politics and Current Affairs: Drugs, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989,
at 21, 21 (based on estimates of production, transportation, and distribution
costs compared to street value).
7" Cleaning Up Dirty Laundering, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 1988, at 63, 63.
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cated laundering scheme capable of overcoming the obstacles
inherent in the domestic laundering of enormous sums of
'narcodollars.' "8o
The existence of offshore banks"1 in tax and secrecy
havens and the reluctance of those countries to breach the
confidentiality on which their financial sectors depend to
attract deposits, have allowed drug traffickers to develop
complex international money laundering networks. For drug
traffickers seeking to launder money, financial secrecy is
paramount in avoiding scrutiny by law enforcement and tax
authorities.8 " Financial secrecy may also be desirable for
personal, legitimate business, fiscal, and political rea-
sons.
83
The legal prototype for a secrecy haven was created in
Switzerland during the 1930s." Switzerland had a long
tradition of privacy that was enshrined in the Swiss Constitu-
tion and the Civil Code. Switzerland responded to the world
financial crisis of the 1930s and Nazi investigations into
Jewish accounts in Switzerland by enacting the Banking Law
" Jeffrey I. Horowitz, Comment, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws
Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20
TEX. INT'L L.J. 133, 137 (1985).
81 "[A]n offshore bank is a corporation organized and licensed under the
banking laws of a foreign jurisdiction which is conducive to conducting
international financial transactions with minimal tax, banking, and
securities regulations." Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and
Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1983)
(statement of Jerome Schneider, President, W.F.I. Corp.) [hereinafter Crime
and Secrecy Hearings].
8" The need for financial secrecy is, however, by no means a new desire.
In 1593, the first written reference to banking secrecy was made in the
statutes of Italy's Banco Ambrosiano. "You are not to give information to
other people, except to the (depositor), his [or her] attorneys and heirs,
under penalty of losing office or greater sanction .... " quoted in European
Banking Secrecy and Disclosure Requirements: the Record, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at 38.
"3 See generally, INGO WALTER, THE SECRET MONEY MARKET: INSIDE THE
DARK WORLD OF TAX EVASION, FINANCIAL FRAUD, INSIDER TRADING, MONEY
LAUNDERING, AND CAPITAL FLIGHT (1990).
84 Andrea M. Grilli, Preventing Billions From Being Washed Offshore: A
Growing Approach To Stopping International Drug Trafficking, 14
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 65, 68 (1987).
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of 1934, which created tough criminal penalties for violators of
disclosure prohibitions."
Today, nearly forty countries in all parts of the world are
considered secrecy and tax havens, including Switzerland,
Austria, Monaco, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay,
Gibraltar, and the Bahamas. 6 Also, sitting in the center of
the EEC, is Luxembourg, one of the three largest money
havens in the world, with roughly $160 billion in foreign
deposits in 120-odd banks.8 " Ironically, the number and
"5 See id.; WALTER, supra note 83, at 190-91 (Following a revision of the
code in 1982, article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law states:
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as
officer, employee, mandatory, liquidator or commissioner of a bank,
as a representative of the Banking Commission, officer or employee
of a recognized auditing company, or whoever tries to induce others
to violate professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term
not to exceed six months or by a fine not exceeding 50,000 francs.
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be
a fine not exceeding 30,000 francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even
after termination of the official or employment relationship or the
exercise of the profession.
4. Federal and cantonal regulation concerning the obligation to
testify and to furnish information to a government authority shall
remain reserved.).
"' WALTER, supra note 83, at 187.
7 See WALTER, supra note 83, at 222-23; Edwin A. Finn, Luxembourg:
Color it Green, FORBES, Apr. 20, 1987, at 42, 42 (The Cayman Islands is
acknowledged to be the largest haven with over $200 billion in deposits.
Switzerland and Luxembourg are thought to be the second and third largest
containing roughly equal deposits.).
The rise of Luxembourg as a money haven has coincided with the
loosening of Switzerland's secrecy practices in the face of pressure from the
United States. See Finn, supra, at 42-44. In 1986 alone, foreign deposits
jumped 40% in Luxembourg. "At a time when most governments are
enacting laws to erode banking and business confidentiality, Luxembourg
has enacted new provisions forbidding its banks to disclose information to
local and foreign... authorities." Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 22, at
121. In both 1981 and 1984, the Luxembourg parliament passed new
confidentiality statutes that, among other things, created mandatory jail
sentences for anyone convicted of making unauthorized disclosures of
financial information. In order to breach bank secrecy in Luxembourg an
order from a Luxembourg court is required.Foreign authorities, however, are
blocked from even seeking such an order "unless a depositor has been
charged at home with an offense that is also a crime in Luxembourg and,
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sophistication of tax and secrecy havens that support much of
international money laundering can be traced in part to the
same changes in United States tax law that produced the
growth of Euromarket financing."8
Beginning in the 1960s, domestic [United States]
corporations established offshore finance subsidiaries to
avoid the effects of several changes in the United States
income tax laws that made raising capital in foreign
markets less advantageous. The boom in offshore
Euromarket financing in turn resulted in the
tremendous growth of offshore banking."
With the establishment of a large network of banks in the tax
and secrecy countries to handle the legitimate business from
the Euromarkets, it did not take drug traffickers long to turn
to the havens for their illegal needs.
Although the veil of secrecy over the havens' financial
practices has prevented the development of much concrete
information concerning the nature or extent of these schemes,
the basic money laundering patterns are well-documented.
Drug profits initially come in the form of millions of small
denomination bills collected from street sales.9" The
traffickers' first objective is to consolidate and reduce the
volume of these funds so that they can be transported more
easily.9 ' The basic technique for this initial stage of launder-
moreover, relates to the account in question." Finn, supra, at 44.
88 See notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
8, Horowitz, supra note 80, at 135.
See Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and
Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1332 (Wisotsky has
calculated that in 1981 "a theoretical maximum of 360 million transactions"
occurred on American streets.).
" Wisotsky explains:
Importers and major dealers ... must confront the problem of
processing a volume of cash so enormous that it must be weighed
instead of counted, or counted with the aid of high-speed machines.
In fact, one informant claims that 'getting rid of the money has
become of the hardest part of the dope business.'
Id. at 1333 (citation omitted).
The advantage of consolidating the small bills received in street
transactions into larger denominations can be seen by comparing the value
of a given weight of bills: one pound of $20 bills equals $9,080, one pound
of $100 bills equals $45,400; 100 pounds of $20 bills equals $908,000, 100
pounds of $100 bills equals $4,540,000. See Crime and Secrecy Hearings,
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ing is known colloquially as "smurfing." The "smurf"
changes the small denomination bills into large denomination
bills, cashier's checks, or money orders by repetitively visiting
bank after bank with amounts insufficient to arouse suspi-
cion."' Cashier's checks and money orders are especially
useful because, unlike two-party checks, "they are guaranteed
and require no underlying bank account," and, unlike certified
checks, "no payor need be identified."'
Once the trafficker has transformed the currency collected
from street sales into a manageable form, the trafficker has
two options for moving the money out of the country in which
the drug sales were made. A courier may be hired to physical-
ly transport the funds to a money haven jurisdiction for
deposit. Alternatively, the funds can be deposited in an
account-which was opened using forged identity documents
or in the name of a shell corporation-at a cooperative
domestic bank. The funds can then be wire transferred to
another shell corporation's account at a bank in the money
haven."'
With the money safely deposited in a money haven bank,
the trafficker can freely move the funds into legitimate
investments anywhere in the world. The trafficker is also free
to move offshore funds into the country of the trafficker's
choice by making "loans" from the shell corporation's account
at the money haven bank to a legitimate front company,
another shell corporation, or an individual.9"
Regardless of the method used,"' money laundering has
supra note 81, at 312.
," A smurf is a drug money courier, named after the small blue cartoon
character of that name. See Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering,
and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41
FLA. L. REV. 287, 288 (1989); Josephine Carr & Christina Morton, How to
Recognise a Money Launderer, 8 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1989, at 10, 12.
" RICO Reform: Money Laundering - A Legal Analysis: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 468 (1988) [hereinafter RICO Reform
Hearings]; Welling, supra note 92, at 291 (Other popular forms for the
smurfs to change cash into are postal money orders, gold, and stamps.).
,4 Welling, supra note 92, at 291 n.19.
"See Horowitz, supra note 80, at 139.
"See id. at 140.
Drug Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985)
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a number of detrimental effects. In particular, "laundering is
harmful because it allows the underlying criminal activity to
thrive ... Without laundering, the risk/reward ratio for the
underlying crime is unattractive ... Efficient laundering
renders the underlying crime lucrative, and therefore perpetu-
ates it.""" Moreover,
Money laundering... is an extremely lucrative crimi-
nal enterprise in its own right ... [I]nvestigations
ha[ve] uncovered members of an emerging criminal
class. They are professional money launderers who aid
and abet other criminals through financial activities.
These individuals do not fit the stereotype of an under-
world criminal. They are accountants, attorneys,
money brokers, and members of other legitimate
professions. They need not become involved with the
underlying criminal activity except to conceal and
transfer the proceeds that result from it. They are
drawn to their illicit activity for the same reason that
drug trafficking attracts new criminals to replace those
who are convicted and imprisoned; and that reason is
simply greed. Money laundering, for them, is an easy
route to an almost limitless wealth.99
The facilitation of criminal profit and the creation of a new
category of criminal have combined with the loss of tax
revenue from the money in the underground economy and the
fear of widespread corruption of the world's financial system
to spur the Council of the European Communities to approve
a directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose of money laundering.0 0
[hereinafter Drug Money Laundering Hearing] (prepared statement of John
M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), U.S.
Department of the Treasury) ("There are seemingly infinite ways for
criminals to accomplish [money laundering]."). For examples of money
laundering schemes that have been uncovered see RICO Reform Hearings,
supra note 93, at 466-68; WALTER, supra note 83, at 171-181.
"' Welling, supra note 92, at 291.
"9 Drug Money Laundering Hearing, supra note 97, at 20-21 (statement
of John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations),
U.S. Department of the Treasury).
100 Money Laundering Directive, supra note 23.
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4.2. Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System
for the Purpose of Money Laundering
The rationale behind the Money Laundering Directive is
clear. The Explanatory Memorandum, which accompanied the
Money Laundering Directive as it was originally proposed,01
notes that "[t]he Community, which is responsible for adopting
the necessary measures to ensure the soundness and stability
of the European financial system, cannot be indifferent to the
involvement of credit and financial institutions in money
laundering."' ° The fear of financial regulators is that "when
credit and financial institutions are used to launder proceeds
from criminal activities ... the soundness and stability of the
[particular] institution concerned and confidence in the
financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopar-
dized."' 3 As the preamble of the Money Laundering Direc-
tive acknowledges, "money laundering is usually carried out in
an international context so that the criminal origin of the
funds can be better disguised [therefore] measures exclusively
adopted at a national level, without taking account of interna-
tional coordination and cooperation, would have very limited
effects."'" Moreover, ad hoc domestic efforts to stop money
laundering could slow or block the integration of the European
financial system.0 5
... Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 90/C 1990 O.J. (C 106) 6.
102 Explanatory Memorandum on the Proposal for a Council Directive on
prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering,
1990 O.J. COM(90) 106 Final, at II, point 2 [hereinafter Explanatory
Memorandum].
1o3 Money Laundering Directive, supra note 23, pmbl. at 77.
104 Id. at 78.
105 For example:
[L]ack of Community action against money laundering could lead
Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial
systems, to adopt measures which could be inconsistent with the
completion of the single market ... [I]n order to facilitate their
criminal activities, launderers could try to take advantage of the
freedom of capital movement and freedom to supply financial
services which the integrated financial area involves, if certain
coordinating measures are not adopted at Community level.
Id. at 77.
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After defining money laundering'" and the type of finan-
cial services firms covered, ° the directive imposes signifi-
cant new duties on Member States and the FSIV" The rest
of this section provides a brief outline and commentary on
those provisions of the Money Laundering Directive that create
these duties.
Article 2 requires that the Member States "prohibit" money
laundering as defined in the directive." g As of June 1990,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom had
already passed laws which criminalized money laundering;
Belgium and Germany were considering similar legislation;
Spain and the Netherlands had not adopted similar laws."'
Article 3 imposes significant specific duties on FSI firms in
the form of so-called "know-your-customer" rules. Subsection
1, mandates that FSI firms "require identification of their
customers by means of supporting evidence" prior to entering
106 Money laundering is defined in Article 1 of the directive as the
following conduct when committed intentionally:
- the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property
is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in
such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit
origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in
the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of
his action,
- the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of
property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal
activity or from an act of participation in such activity,
- the acquisition, possession, or use of property, knowing, at the time
of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or
from an act of participation in such activity,
- participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any
of the actions mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. at 79.
107 For definition see footnotes 46-49 and accompanying text.
108 According to Article 16, Member States are to have brought"into force
the laws, regulations and administrative decisions necessary to comply with
this Directive" by 1 January 1993. Money Laundering Directive, supra note
23 at 81.
'09 Id. at 79.
Thomas Crocker, Bankers, Police Yourselves, 9 INT L FIN. L. REV.,
June 1990, at 10, 10.
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into business relations with that customer."' Subsection 2
extends the identification requirement to all transactions, or
series of transactions that appear linked, involving ECU
15,000 or more.rn Subsection 6 effectively extends subsec-
tion 2 by imposing a duty on FSI firms to pursue identification
of customers "even where the amount of the transaction is
lower than the threshold laid down, wherever there is suspi-
cion of money laundering."
118
Such legislation forces FSI firms to scrutinize every
transaction they engage in to determine if there is even the
mere "suspicion" of money laundering. In order to identify a
suspicion a financial institution will often have to question a
client, even if that client appears to be legitimate. Such
questioning, however, is likely to cause a client, whether
honest or not, to find a different firm with which to conduct
business."' While financial firms obviously find such a
result unacceptable, those who support this requirement
contend that "[olnly if every [FSI firm] is under a duty to so
question every client is the 'embarrassing' problem re-
moved."115
In instances where the FSI firm is unsure if a customer is
acting on its own behalf, and even in cases where there is no
suspicion of money laundering, subsection 5 requires that the
institutions "take reasonable measures to obtain information
as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those
customers are acting [i.e., the beneficial owner].""'
"Know-your-customer" rules have been heavily criticized as
being economically unworkable. The Money Laundering
Directive will force FSI firms to scrutinize every transaction
they engage in both to eliminate the suspicion of money
laundering (and consequently, the duty to perform identifica-
tion procedures on a customer) and to ensure that a customer
' Money Laundering Directive, supra note 23, art. 3, subsec. 1, at 79.
112 Id., art. 3, subsec. 2, at 80. ECU 15,000 is worth approximately US$
18,000. This reporting requirement is similar to the rules for American
banks.
"' Money Laundering Directive, art. 3, subsec. 6, at 80. (emphasis
supplied).
14 See Carr, supra note 92, at 13.
118 Id.
n Money Laundering Directive, supra note 23, art. 3, subsec. 5, at 80.
(emphasis supplied).
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is acting for itself and not someone else, even if their motives
are completely legitimate. Prior to the Directive's approval, a
lawyer noted that it
would certainly [create] an upward pressure on fees.
Someone would have to pay for the time spent on
investigating the client and recording the fact that all
the proper checks had been made. Either there would
be a significant decrease in fee income ... or an
increased cost to the client."
As the globalization and liberalization of currency transactions
turns financial services into more of a commodity business,
either outcome would adversely effect EEC FSI firms compet-
ing for deposits from around the world.
Article 4 further ensures that EEC FSI firms's costs will
rise by requiring them to keep evidence of customer identifica-
tion for at least five years after the relationship with a
customer has ended and to keep transaction records for at
least five years following execution of a transaction.
Article 5 places a duty on Member States to ensure that
FSI firms "examine with special attention any transaction
which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be
related to money laundering.""' As with Article 3, this
requirement means that FSI firms will have to scrutinize
virtually every transaction they carry out, because Article 5
places the burden, and thus the liability, of identifying money
laundering transactions on the firms.
Article 6 creates another affirmative duty for FSI institu-
tions and explicitly imposes it on their directors and employees
as well. Article 6 requires firms to "cooperate fully with the
authorities responsible for combating money laundering by
informing those authorities, on their own initiative, of any fact
which might be an indication of money laundering.""' This
requirement places FSI firms in danger of being penalized for
failing to inform when the authorities deem they should have.
Article 6 also dictates that financial institutions are to turn
over to the authorities "all necessary information." The lack
" An unidentified lawyer quoted in Christina Morton, Will the Net Close
in on Lawyers?, 8 INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1989, at 11, 11.
", Money Laundering Directive, supra note 23, art. 5, at 80.
'
1 Id., art. 6, at 80. (emphasis supplied).
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of a specific definition of necessary information appears to give
the law enforcement authorities unprecedented power to seize
firms' records.
Article 7 attacks the ability of FSI firms to govern their
own affairs by requiring them to "refrain from carrying out
transactions which they know or suspect to be related to
money laundering until they have apprised the authorities....
Those authorities may ... give instructions not to execute the
operation."' 0 FSI firms are thus required to relinquish their
operational authority and submit to the decision-making of
state authorities. Article 7's second sentence appears to be a
potential loophole which may minimize the impact of that
article's first sentence; the second sentence states, "Where...
a transaction is suspected of giving rise to money laundering
and where to refrain [from carrying out such transaction] is
impossible or is likely to frustrate efforts to pursue the
beneficiaries of a suspected money-laundering operation, the
institutions concerned shall apprise the authorities immediate-
ly afterwards."' Even if a firm can avoid submitting its
initial decision to state authorities based on this second clause,
however, the notification requirement will open the firm to
second-guessing and possible censure for failing to inform
authorities prior to performing a transaction.
Article 9 absolves institutions, directors and, employees
from any civil or criminal liability for disclosing in good faith
the information required in Articles 6 and 7. Accordingly, this
article states that the delivery of such information to the
authorities "shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on
disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any
legislative, regulatory or administrative provision."'
Article 9 thus seeks to attack the secrecy barriers that
countries (e.g., Luxembourg) have erected and which have
helped expand the FSI in those countries. By leveling the
secrecy advantage Article 9 decreases the likelihood of large
outflows of capital from countries with strict reporting
requirements to countries with strict secrecy regimes.
However, the dismantling of client account protections also
'20 Id., art. 7, at 80.
121 Id.
12 Id., art. 9, at 81.
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exposes legitimate accounts to the danger of a mandatory
release of valuable confidential information. This article
subordinates depositors' privacy rights to the right of state
authorities to step in and scrutinize any transaction merely by
alleging that such transaction is "suspicious." The FSI has
ended up caught in the middle-affirmatively required to act
as a quasi-state enforcement agency and to provide informa-
tion to the authorities, but answerable in the commercial
marketplace to disgruntled depositors whose financial privacy
is being assailed.
Article l's first subsection states that "Member States
shall ensure that credit and financial institutions establish
adequate procedures of internal control and communication in
order to forestall and prevent operations related with money
laundering."12 Subsection 2 mandates that firms make
their employees aware of the Money, Laundering Directive's
provisions by holding "special training programmes" for
"relevant employees" in order "to help them recognize opera-
tions which may be related to money laundering as well as to
instruct them as to how to proceed in such cases."' FSI
firms are thus forced both to give up a significant amount of
control over their internal governance and to pay for this loss
of control themselves through the required sponsorship of
special programs.
4.3. Effect of the Money Laundering Directive on Competition
Within the FSI
Financial services firms have traditionally had two main
duties: first, to correctly carry out client orders while acting in
the best interests of each client; second, to manage the bank
profitably while avoiding risks that would threaten the
institution's solvency.'25 The firms' duty of confidentiality
in relation to its clients has generally circumscribed these
traditional duties. 2 '
123 Id., art. 11, subsec. 1, at 81.
124 Id., art. 11, subsec. 2, at 81.
126 See Alain Hirsch, "Dirty Money" and Swiss Banking Regulations, 8 J.
CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 373, 373 (1986).
126 For example,
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Despite the asserted rationale that coordinated action is
necessary to regulate money laundering effectively without
diminishing the competitive advantage of the common market,
the imposition of the Money Laundering Directive's new duties
brings into question the ability of EEC FSI firms to meet their
traditional duties while profiting fully from the competitive
advantage created by free capital movement.
The interplay between the regulatory effect of the Money
Laundering Directive and the deregulatory effect of the free
movement of capital will create competitive pressures that will
have notable impact on firms' set of potential responses to the
new legal requirements imposed by the Money Laundering
Directive."" The laws themselves will not solely determine
the FSrs behavior; rather, the competitive forces unleashed by
the change in legal structure will themselves largely determine
how firms choose to react to the new legal environment. In all
likelihood, the competitive forces produced by the on-going
liberalization of capital movements will work against the FSI's
desire to comply with the new duties required by the Money
Laundering Directive. This friction will affect the EEC FSI's
competitive posture both within the EEC and in relation to the
rest of the world.
The free movement of capital is one manifestation of the
EEC's recent adoption of a "remove the barriers first and let
national systems compete for survival afterwards"'2 8 ap-
proach to legislation. In principle, such a "competitive
lawmaking" scheme will produce some Member States that
offer more advantageous business laws than other Member
States. The free movement of capital will eventually allow
[iun the UK the case of Tournier v. National Provincial and Union
Bank of England (1924) established the legal basis of the duty of
confidentiality. The case held that it is a contractual duty between
bank and customer not to disclose information unlawfully to third
parties. But the case also established four exceptions: where
disclosure is under compulsion of law; where there is a duty to the
public to disclose; where the interest of the bank require [sic]
disclosure; where disclosure is made with the express consent of the
customer.
Carr, supra note 92, at 12.
.17 Cf., Gregory J. Lyons, Taking Money Launderers to the Cleaners: A
Problem SolvingAnalysis of Current Legislation, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
635, 644 (1990).
"' Europe's Capital Achievement, ECONOMIST, June 18, 1988, 14, 14.
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businesses to migrate to those Member States with legal
systems that best serve their needs.
The danger in competitive lawmaking is twofold. On the
one hand, Member States may feel compelled to follow a lowest
common denominator approach to legislation, ensuring that
the level of regulation imposed in the least regulated Member
State will become the norm throughout the EEC. On the other
hand, a group of Member States could band together to force
the imposition of EEC-wide regulations aimed at diminishing
or destroying a single Member State's competitive legal
advantage. In this case, the EEC would be defeating the free
competition goal that the economic union is supposed to be
based on.
In the case of the FSI and money laundering, this lawmak-
ing dilemma is posed most acutely by Luxembourg. While
most governments have passed laws to erode banking and
business confidentiality, Luxembourg has established new laws
forbidding its banks to issue information to local or foreign tax
authorities.1 2 Under current EEC policy, Member States
will be required to follow common procedures in the collection
and exchange of currency transaction information, unless a
Member State already has conflicting national laws or formal
administrative regulations.' ° Luxembourg's move to create
conflicting national legislation before the imposition of
common standards is a clear signal that they will not give up
the confidentiality on which their financial sector has come to
depend without a fight.'
Luxembourg's opposition to the type of duties that the
Money Laundering Directive imposes has two possible
outcomes. First, if Luxembourg wishes to remain a secrecy
haven in spite of the directive and thus refuses to bring its
financial disclosure requirements into line with the rest of the
EEC, either by delaying the passage of the necessary legisla-
tion to enact the Money Laundering Directive or by only
128 Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 22, at 121.
130 Id.
181 Luxembourg has passed laws criminalizing money laundering andhas
given indications that it will cooperate with criminal investigations. Id.
These measures, however, do not evince any enthusiasm for the affirmative
duty to specially scrutinize customers and transactions imposed by the
Money Laundering Directive. Cf., William Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in
International Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1095 (1989).
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loosely enforcing its provisions, the free movement of capital
will combine with the attraction of greater financial confidenti-
ality to drain capital from the rest of the EEC into Luxem-
bourg. This capital outflow may severely hurt the FSI of the
other 11 Member States, who would have to contemplate
individual legislative responses to the competitive advantage
created by Luxembourg's secrecy laws. Moreover, the survival
of Luxembourg's confidentiality laws would leave money
launderers a secrecy haven within the EEC that would allow
them, by moving their money into Luxembourgian accounts, to
spread their laundered funds throughout the EEC free from
border controls, reporting requirements, or other traditional
law enforcement deterrents. The specter this scenario raises
is that the huge profits generated by the drug business once
ensconced in secret Luxembourg accounts could be used by the
traffickers to gain control of significant businesses and real
estate throughout Europe.
The fear of Europe awash in drug money points to the
second possibility created by Luxembourg's potential unwill-
ingness to compromise its banking secrecy through submitting
to the duties required by the Money Laundering Directive. If
the Luxembourg government embraces the Money Laundering
Directive, the FSI in Luxembourg, recognizing the continued
importance of its tradition of confidentiality in competing with
other money markets, may act in tacit unison to ignore or
impede the newly imposed duties."3 2 The huge flow of cur-
rency in and out of Luxembourg that is likely to arise with the
advent of free capital movement will limit the effectiveness of
law enforcement officials in policing currency transactions.'
This scenario would allow the FSI in Luxembourg to reap the
combined competitive advantage of financial secrecy and free
capital movement, while making it difficult for other Member
"s The basic question raised here is whether members of the FSI,
although private entities, should be forced to act as quasi-public institutions
in reporting on potential money laundering activity. See Hirsch, supra note
125, at 373.
"3 In addition to its secrecy laws, Luxembourg's tax laws (e.g., no
withholding tax on interest payments to investors) ensure that the country
will be a powerful magnet for attracting funds to its FSI even if its
confidentiality rules are officially relaxed. See 1992; The Barriers Within,
supra note 11, at 15.
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States to target the Luxembourg government as a scapegoat
for failing to support the Money Laundering Directive.
In order to remain competitive, the FSI in other Member
States would have to respond to the practices developed in
Luxembourg. Competitive pressure could thus thwart the
policies behind the Money Laundering Directive by making it
economically infeasible for firms to comply with the strict
reporting requirements. Law enforcement bodies would then
be left to police tightly not only the traffickers, but the FSI
itself to ensure that the Money Laundering Directive's
requirements were being met. This new burden would further
strain already taxed law enforcement capabilities.
The situations outlined above indicate the difficulty of
reconciling the free movement of capital and the control of
money laundering within the competitive lawmaking model
adopted by the EEC. On a world-wide scale these goals are
equally difficult to tally with each other and with the realities
of an increasingly competitive financial market place.
The affirmative duty imposed by the Money Laundering
Directive to report certain types of transactions creates a fear
in the FSI of repercussions from customers who discover their
financial services institution has revealed their account
information to the government. M The questions a firm
must ask to identify the beneficial owner of an account may
similarly create misunderstandings with a client, especially as
these questions would normally not be asked by firms in other
countries. Clients may resent the mistrust implied by such
questions, "a mistrust which would be regarded as an unsuit-
able basis of relations between a [firm] and its clients."" 5
This problem is likely to be particularly acute when a FSI firm
is dealing with a foreign customer who will be particularly
sensitive to perceived slights based on nationality. Either the
revealing of account information or the asking of too many
sensitive questions is likely to drive customers to seek
financial services elsewhere, probably in countries which are
more accommodating than those in the EEC.
The monitoring duties placed on the FSI will become
increasingly difficult to meet as the speed of international
1 See Lyons, supra note 127, at 649.
13 Hirsch, supra note 125, at 374.
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business picks up creating larger numbers of capital flows in
more complex and sophisticated transactions involving more
businesses. The competitive advantage that the free move-
ment of capital has created for the EEC FSI will erode as
firms' ability to accommodate their customers in a fast and
efficient manner decreases. This decline will occur in direct
proportion to the complexity and subjectivity of the reporting
requirements imposed by the Money Laundering Directive.3 6
The bottom line of the FSI will further be hurt by the
direct costs incurred as the result of setting up reporting
mechanisms, training employees, and insuring against liability
for failing to recognize an illegal transaction later identified by
law enforcement authorities. While these direct costs will
particularly hurt smaller and more marginal firms, they also
symbolize the danger of destroying the level playing field
needed for the free movement of capital. As with any regulato-
ry scheme, firms will choose to follow the duties the Money
Laundering Directive has imposed with varying degrees of
attention. Unless enforcement of these duties is swift,
uniform, and precise, less diligent firms will gain a competitive
advantage. Those firms receiving particular scrutiny will thus
be at a disadvantage as compared to other EEC and non-EEC
firms.
Perhaps the EEC FSI's biggest fear is that instead of
reaping a financial windfall based on the Capital Movements
Directive's competitive advantages, the Money Laundering
Directive's competitive disadvantages will bolster presently
outlying financial centers by pulling capital away from the
major European financial centers. If the major financial
centers see too much capital flowing to outlying centers, how
long they will actively comply with reporting requirements
that are detrimental to their competitive position in the world
market is unclear.' 7
... Cf., Lyons, supra note 127, at 650.
1"7 Cleaning Up Dirty Laundering, supra note 79, at 63. (While the
major financial centers clearly do not want to actively aid money launder-
ing, they may well feel that the reporting requirements are an ineffective
and unfair competitive disadvantage when "[r]affish financial centres such
as Vanuatu, Uruguay, and Hongkong, are full of banks more interested in
taking a deposit, any deposit, than in scanning the references of potential
customers.")
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5. CONCLUSION
Competing goals of international finance law, each attrac-
tive when considered alone, often produce friction when
implemented together. The free movement of capital, as
embodied in the Capital Movements Directive, is accepted as
a necessary legal construct if the EEC is to achieve its goal of
an unfettered common market. Money laundering is a large
and persistent problem that the Money Laundering Directive
seeks to address by regulating financial services transactions.
The friction these two directives are likely to create as they
are enforced simultaneously is exemplified by the situation in
Luxembourg. In that country many bankers believe banking
secrecy is vital to the ability of the country's FSI to attract
deposits, while law enforcement officials in the EEC see this
secrecy primarily as an instrument facilitating money launder-
ing.
38
In balancing the effect these potentially competing direc-
tives have on the financial services industry in the European
Economic Community, it is important to keep in mind that the
fundamental goal of the economic union is to create a zone of
free competition throughout Europe. The EEC must be wary
that in approaching the goal of a common market it does not
do away with the present restrictive maze of national regula-
tion merely to erect in its place a new labyrinth of pan-
European regulation.
1"8 Cf., Park, supra note 131, at 1068.
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